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Case No. 20150218-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
KRISTOPHER ENGLAND, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an order of restitution following a conviction 
for theft, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code section 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Kristopher England pleaded guilty to theft after he sent a prospective 
customer's car to an auto scrapyard. The car was in the midst of being 
extensively customized to the victim's specifications and for the victim's 
personal use. 
Did the trial court act within its discretion when it calculated the 
victim's loss based on the original purchase price of the car and of the 
improvements to the car as it was undergoing customization, rather than on 
generic retail value? 
Standard of Review. While the trial court's interpretation of the 
relevant restitution statutes is reviewed for correctness, its application of 
those statutes in ordering restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 
State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 5, 353 P.3d 179; State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 
5, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "A trial court will be deemed to have abused its 
discretion only if no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the trial court." Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 5 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (alteration in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code§ 77-38a-102 
Utah Code§ 77-38a-301 
Utah Code§ 77-38a-302. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves England's challenge to the amount of restitution 
ordered by the trial court. England pleaded guilty to theft after removing 
the victim's car from England's car repair shop and selling it to an auto 
scrapyard. RS0-81. At sentencing, England was ordered to pay restitution, 
-2-
which the court set at $8,277.87, following an evidentiary hearing. R108, 
138-39. 
The victim, a disabled Iraq War veteran, purchased a 1995 Eagle 
Talon TSI for $2,500 sometime before 2012. Rl, 113; R161:9, 162:7-8; Exl. 
He planned to customize it for his son, who would be turning sixteen in a 
few years. R113; R163:15-16. The victim took the Talon to his mechanic 
several times, eventually leaving it at the shop for over a year and a half as 
the mechanic worked on it. R161:9. According to England, the mechanic 
specialized in customizing "tuner cars." 1 R162:58-59. 
The mechanic made several improvements to the Talon. His goal was 
to transform the Talon, which was in "pristine condition" when he received 
it, into "something formidable" for the victim's son. R161:9, 13. The 
mechanic installed a body kit, intercooler and piping kit, blow-off valve 
adapter, halo projector headlights, downpipe, exhaust system, exhaust pipe, 
muffler, battery, and wheel hub and bearing assembly. R161:36-43; Ex2; 
Ex4. He removed the engine and sent it to a machinist to have it rebuilt as a 
turbo-charged engine. R26, 34-35. After making the modifications and 
1 Tuner cars are cars that are modified to enhance performance or 
appearance as "a way to personalize the characteristics of a vehicle to the 
owner's preference." Wikipedia, Car tuning, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/ 
index.php?title=Car_tuning&oldid=691111844 (as of November 17, 2015, 
18:59UTC). 
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while waiting for the engine, the mechanic fully prepped the Talon for a 
custom paint job, flocking, sanding, priming, and jambing the car-putting 
the finish coat on the door jamb, under the hood, and in the engine 
compartment-leaving only a final three-stage coat to be completed on the 
exterior once he reinstalled the engine. R21-24. The victim paid the 
mechanic for the work he had completed, with the total cost of the installed 
parts and labor, excluding work on the engine, totaling $5,777.87. R138-39; 
162:8-11; Ex2; Ex4. 
In mid-2013, the mechanic entered into a business agreement with 
England, though the details of the deal are unclear. R161:46; 162:58-60, 78. 
The two apparently went into business together, but after a few weeks the 
mechanic dropped out of the picture. R162:58-59, 81, 84-86. England soon 
moved the business to another location. R162:59-60. He initially left the 
Talon at the old location, but at the insistence of the landlord, England had 
it moved to his new shop. R162:62-64. 
The victim visited England at his new shop and asked him to 
continue work on the Talon. England refused. R162:64-65. Instead, 
without authorization from the victim, England told one of his employees to 
sell the Talon to a scrapyard that did not require a vehicle title. R162:26-27, 
37. The employee did so, and the scrapyard paid England $300 for the 
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Talon. R162:35-36. At the scrapyard, the Talon was stripped of many of its 
salable parts, including most of the improvements made by the mechanic. 
R161:63-64; Ex5. 
The State charged England on December 10, 2013, with second-degree 
felony theft and class B misdemeanor theft by deception. Rl. England 
entered into a plea agreement with the State involving this and six other 
umelated cases. R67, 70. England pleaded guilty to lesser charges and 
agreed to pay restitution. R67, 70-71, 75-76. 
The trial court sentenced England to zero to five years imprisonment 
for the underlying offense, imposed a $5,000 fine, and ordered him to pay 
restitution. R108-09; 163:20-21. The State later moved for entry of a 
restitution order in the amount of $13,402.76. Rll0. England objected to the 
amount, R125, and the trial court held a two-day evidentiary hearing. R161, 
162. 
At the hearing, the State presented extensive evidence on the value of 
the Talon: the victim testified that he purchased the Talon for $2,500, 
R162:7-8; the State submitted an exhibit showing the 2014 Kelley Blue Book 
private party resale value for 1995 Talons with comparable miles, ranging 
from $1,666 to $2,311, Exl; the mechanic testified that when the victim left 
the Talon with him in 2011, it would have been classified as being in "Very 
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Good" condition in terms of the Kelly Blue Book, which corresponded to a 
private party resale value of $2,147 in 2014, R161:14, Exl; the mechanic 
testified that "putting all these modifications to the car, do[es] increase the 
value of the vehicle," and he estimated the car to be worth $3,500 to $5,000, 
though his testimony conflicted as to whether that estimate applied before 
or after the modifications, R161:10-17; and the State presented invoices for 
the customization work, eliciting testimony from the mechanic as to which 
parts had been installed and which had not, and demonstrating that the 
victim paid $5,777.87 for the work that had been performed before the theft, 
R161: 36-43, 162:8-11; Ex2; Ex4. 
Because the evidence showed that not all of the customization work 
had been performed, the State reduced its requested restitution from 
$13,402.76 to $9,277,87, reflecting what it argued was the fair market value 
of a typical 1995 Talon based on the mechanic's testimony ($3,500), plus the 
value of all the added improvements ($5,777.87). R162:89-94. Upon 
questioning from the trial court, the State conceded that the court could use 
the initial purchase price of the Talon ($2,500) as a more conservative 
starting point. R162:93-94. 
-6-
u 
England elicited testimony from the mechanic that, even without an 
engine,2 the Talon would have been worth II at least" $3,500 with the 
improvements he had made. R161:60. England testified that the Talon 
"was just a frame of a car" and did not have the improvements on it when 
he sold it to the scrapyard for $300. R162:65-66, 68, 70. Two of his 
employees testified similarly. R162:34-36, 42-43. England testified that 
$300 was "about all you're going to get for that." R162:70. In closing, 
England argued that the Talon was "not a vehicle," but merely 11 a shell of a 
vehicle," and $300 was a fair value for that II piece of metal." R162:88. 
The trial court agreed with the State, implicitly rejecting the testimony 
that the improvements were not on the Talon when England sent it to the 
scrapyard. In its ruling, the court calculated the amount of restitution owed 
by starting with the purchase price of the vehicle ($2,500) and adding the 
amount paid for parts actually installed on the car ($5,777.87), for a total 
restitution amount of $8,277.87, to be paid in monthly installments of at 
least $100. R138-39, 159; 161:36-43. The court entered its order on April 22, 
2015, and England timely appealed. R141, 159. 
2 When England sent the Talon to the scrapyard, the engine was 
either at the machine shop or at the n1echanic' s house, and it apparently 
remained at the mechanic's house at the time of the restitution hearing. 
R161:26, 34. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The purpose of restitution is to make victims whole when they suffer 
demonstrable economic injury as a result of a defendant's criminal conduct. 
In cases of theft, the victim's injury is measured by the value of the stolen 
property. Usually, this is the property's retail value. But when the stolen 
property is unique, value is defined as value to the owner. And when the 
stolen property has little or no market in which it is bought and sold, the 
original purchase price will establish its actual value. 
The trial court acted within its discretion when it determined that the 
purchase price of the car itself plus all the improvements that had been 
installed fully compensated the victim for the economic injury he suffered. 
The typical used-car market does not capture the value of a tuner Talon 
modified to a particular owner's personal specifications. This case involves 
unique property. The victim was customizing his car as a tuner car for his 
son, and he made significant investments of time and money to personalize 
the car and enhance its appearance and performance. He was not a retailer. 
And he was not modifying the Talon to enhance its value for resale. 
But the customization project was incomplete when England stole the 
Talon. As a unique car, partially customized to someone else's 
specifications and lacking an engine, there likely would have been no 
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willing buyer for the car, making retail price an unavailable measure of the 
victim's loss. On these facts, using the original price the victim paid for the 
Talon plus the amount he paid for modifications made the victim whole for 
the economic injury he suffered from England's criminal act. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT CALCULATED THE VALUE 
OF A CAR UNDERGOING CUSTOMIZATION FOR 
THE VICTIM'S PERSONAL USE AT THE PURCHASE 
PRICE OF THE CAR AND THE IMPROVEMENTS. 
England contends that the trial court improperly calculated the value 
of the victim's car. Aplt. Br. at 6-8, 12. He argues that the State failed to put 
on evidence of the car's retail value, and that the purchase price of the Talon 
plus the purchase price of improvements exceeded the retail value. Aplt. 
Br. at 6-8. England suggests three alternative calculations: the price the 
scrapyard paid ($300), Aplt. Br. at 8-10; the mechanic's estimation of the 
unfinished Talon's value ($3,500), Aplt. Br. at 10-11; and the purchase price 
of the improvements - but excluding the purchase price of the car 
($5,777.87), Aplt. Br. at 8, 12. 
The trial court acted well within its broad discretion when it 
calculated the victim's loss using the original purchase price of the partially 
customized Talon plus the purchase price of the improvements the 
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mechanic had installed. The touchstone for restitution is the victim's 
demonstrable economic injury. Typically that is measured by the retail 
value of stolen property. But the appropriate measure of loss to the victim 
is flexible and depends on the facts of each case. 
England's alternatives would not truly compensate the victim for his 
injury. For unique property, the value to the owner rather than retail value 
is the appropriate measure. Furthermore, because the Talon was in the 
midst of a customization project and lacked an engine, there was likely little 
or no market for the car at the time it was stolen. And because there was 
likely no retail market for a Talon partially customized to the victim's 
specifications, it was appropriate to measure the value of the victim's loss 
by looking to the original purchase price of the car and of the 
improvements. 
A. Using purchase price of the car and the 
improvements is an appropriate basis to calculate the 
value of unique property or property that likely has 
little or no market. 
The Crime Victims Restitution Act authorizes a sentencing court to 
impose restitution 11 [ w ]hen a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that 
has resulted in pecuniary damages." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-301 (West 
2004); id. § 77-38a-302(1) (West Supp. 2015). The statute defines "pecuniary 
damages" as II all demonstrable economic injury, ... which a person could 
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recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities." Id. § 77-38a-102(6) (West Supp. 2015). The 
relevant civil-action analog to England's theft is conversion. Like theft, 
conversion II is an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without 
lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its 
use and possession." Firkins v. Ruegner, 2009 UT App 167, ~ 5, 213 P.3d 895 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
In cases of conversion, fair market value provides the standard 
measure of damages. Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, ~tjf 26, 
28, 96 P.3d 893; Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). That measure is also explicitly endorsed in the restitution statute. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-102(6) (stating that demonstrable economic injury 
11 includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed"). Fair market value is usually measured as the price at 
which goods are bought and sold on the open market at the time of 
conversion. Winters v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1978); 
Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r,I 6, 8. And retail price generally constitutes 
prima facie evidence of fair market value. See Winters, 586 P.2d at 454; Ault 
v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Morris v. State, 334 P.3d 
1244, 1248 (Alaska Ct. App. 2014). 
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But in the end, the aim in restitution is "making crime victims whole 
for the harms they suffer because of a defendant's criminal conduct." State 
v. Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, ,r 13,351 P.3d 826 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), cert. granted, --- P.3d ---- (Utah Sept. 16, 2015). Trial courts 
therefore have "flexibility in determining damages in order to 'fashion an 
equitable award to the victim."' Id. (quoting State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 
417, ,r 14, 82 P.3d 211); see also Winters, 586 P.2d at 454 ("The rule [for the 
measure of damages] is a flexible one that can be modified in the interest of 
fairness."); accord Henderson, 757 P.2d at 469. That flexibility is reflected in 
two alternatives to using retail price to measure fair market value: cases 
involving unique property and cases involving property for which there is 
likely little or no market.3 
1. The value of unique property such as the "tuner" Talon is 
measured by its value to the property's owner. 
When a tortfeasor converts "unique" property, fair market value is 
measured not by retail price, but by the value to the owner. Winters, 586 
P.2d at 454; accord Firkins, 2009 UT App 167, ,r 8 n.6 ("While market value is 
usually measured with reference to retail value in a relevant market, in the 
3 Although the prosecutor and the trial court focused generally on fair 
market value and did not discuss either of these two justifications, this 
Court may affirm on any ground apparent in the record. State v. Augustine, 
2013 UT App 61, ,r 3, 298 P.3d 693. 
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case of unique property, market value equates to the value to the owner." 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Henderson, 757 P.2d at 468 
("Market value is defined as the price for which the property is bought and 
sold at retail in the marketplace or, in the case of unique property, the value 
to the owner."); cf Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, 19 (stating that when there is 
a "large gap between the amount a willing buyer would pay and the 
amount a willing seller would accept[,] ... the court should err on the side 
of compensating the victim for his or her loss"). 
Calculating value to the owner necessarily requires flexibility on the 
part of the trial court. For example, in Firkins v. Ruegner, a conversion case, 
the trial court determined that the value of a catering truck and trailer-
originally purchased for $50,000 but to which a number of improvements 
had been made-was $100,000. 2009 UT App 167, 116-7. "Although the 
trial court did not explain precisely how it determined the truck and trailer 
were worth $100,000," this Court held that the record supported the 
conclusion that the figure was "a rationally determined value" for the 
property. Id. 16. The record demonstrated that catering trucks typically 
range from $75,000 to $140,000; the victim had purchased the vehicles in a 
"sweetheart" deal; the victim had increased the value of the vehicles by 
making a number of improvements; and ultimately, the Court explained, 
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the vehicles were "unique" and their value should be based on the value to 
the vehicles' owner rather than their retail value. Id. ,r 8 & n.6 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
As a car being customized to the victim's specifications, the Talon 
was unique to the victim, and its value must reflect that fact. The trial court 
was tasked not with determining the value of just any Talon; rather, it was 
tasked with determining the value of the victim's Talon. The typical used-
car market sets retail price based on variations in the make, model, age, and 
mileage of a used car. See Exl. It also accounts for basic variations that a 
manufacturer will typically make to a vehicle's engine, drivetrain, 
transmission, and common amenities. See Exl. It does not account for 
specialized aftermarket modifications such as body kits, intercooler and 
piping kits, or halo projector headlights. See Exl. 
Here the victim was customizing the Talon for his son, changing it 
from a generic Talon to a tuner car. By definition, the Talon was unique. It 
was personalized to fit the performance and appearance standards the 
victim had chosen for his son's car. The victim's demonstrable economic 
injury must account for that customization; it cannot be measured by 
comparing his unique Talon to a generic Talon on the used-car market. 
And the victim was not fixing the car to sell it on the open market. Rather, 
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he invested significant time and money to design and build a tuner car to 
give his son when he turned sixteen. 
The trial court concluded that the value of that investment is best 
measured by the original purchase price of the Talon and the purchase price 
of the improvements the victim paid for. To succeed on appeal, England 
would have to show that no reasonable person would measure the Talon's 
value to the victim in that manner. See Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 5. As 
shown, the trial court had flexibility to determine what would make the 
victim whole and how to calculate the value of the unique tuner Talon to 
the victim to achieve that end. England has not shown that the measure 
used here exceeded that flexibility. 
2. The value of property for which there is likely little or no 
market, such as the partially customized Talon, may be 
measured using purchase price. 
But even if the customized Talon were not considered unique, the 
typical used-car market is the wrong benchmark because there was likely 
little or no market for the Talon when it was in the midst of an extensive 
customization project. Courts must look some place other than the typical 
retail market to assess the actual value of property for which there is "little 
or no market." Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 8. If "there is no demand for 
the item, the recovery is based on actual value .... " Winters, 586 P.2d at 
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454. In other words, it makes little sense to speak of fair market value when 
there is, in fact, no market; the value of the property must be determined by 
looking some place other than the retail market. See Pennington v. Redman 
Van & Storage Co., 97 P. 115, 117 (Utah 1908) ("[M]arket price or value ... is 
not the only basis from which the actual value of articles may be ascertained 
in case such articles are not on the market and therefore may not have a 
market price or value."). The restitution statute implicitly recognizes as 
much when it states that demonstrable economic injury for which 
restitution may be ordered II includes" fair market value but does not limit 
the definition to fair market value. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6); 
Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27, ,I 14,332 P.3d 922 (11 [W]hen any 
statute uses the word 'includes,' it 'means that the items listed are not an 
exclusive list, unless the word II only" or similar language is used to 
expressly indicate that the list is an exclusive list."' (quoting Utah Code 
§ 68-3-12(1)(£))). 
When property has little or no market, the original purchase price of 
the property may establish its actual value. Haycraft v. Adams, 24 P.2d 1110, 
1112 (Utah 1933); Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,I 8. And proof that there is 
actually little or no market is not required when common sense inferences 
suffice. See Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 8 (discussing the likelihood that a 
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market existed for used clothing, without indicating that any evidence had 
been submitted on that score). For example, in State v. Ludlow, this Court 
indicated that purchase price was an appropriate measurement of value for 
used clothing that had been stolen from a victim's car. See 2015 UT App 
146, ilil 8, 13. The Court acknowledged that the victim may not have been 
able to sell the clothing "for more than a nominal amount, but it is unlikely 
that she would have ever considered doing so when the items were still of 
value to her." Id. il 8. In such situations, "[p ]urchase price may ... be a 
more equitable way to valuate a victim's loss of items for which there is 
little or no market." Id. 
That principle applies here. While England argues that "a car" clearly 
has a market value, Aplt. Br. at 9, there is likely "no demand" for a partially 
completed tuner car modified to an individual's specifications, see Winters, 
586 P.2d at 454. The Kelley Blue Book, for example, does not have an option 
for "primed, but not yet painted," "customized, but not quite done," or 
"turbo-charged, but missing the turbo-charged engine." At best, there 
would have been only "little" demand for this work in progress. See 
Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, il 8. When stolen, the Talon was composed of a 
generic car plus a number of modifications designed to ultimately transform 
it into a tuner car. Thus, using the original purchase price of the pre-
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modified Talon plus the purchase pnce of the improvements was an 
appropriate measure of the Talon's value. If the victim were to replace the 
stolen tuner Talon, he likely would have to do so by purchasing another 
generic Talon and paying a mechanic to make the same modifications. 
England also argues that the Talon had a resale market because the 
mechanic testified as to "the actual market value of the car at the time it was 
stolen." Aplt. Br. at 11. In fact, the mechanic testified that the car would be 
"at least worth $3,500" under the hypothetical scenario that he would sell it 
as is. R161:60. He did not testify that anyone would actually be interested 
in buying- let alone selling- such a car. 
But even if the victim hypothetically could have sold the unfinished 
Talon to a willing buyer who was looking for a steep discount on a custom 
car built to someone else's specifications, "it is unlikely that [the victim] 
would have ever considered doing so when the items were still of value to 
[him]." Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, iJ 8. Because there was likely little or no 
market for the unfinished, engineless Talon, use of the original purchase 
price of the car and the improvements was an appropriate way to measure 
the victim's loss. See id. 
* * * 
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In sum, "[t]he appropriate measure of the loss or damage to a victim 
is fact-sensitive and will vary based on the facts of a particular case." 
Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r 15. And using purchase price and the value of 
improvements to measure economic loss is a well-established approach, 
particularly in cases, such as this, involving unique property or property for 
which there is likely little or no market. See Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 8; 
Firkins, 2009 UT App 167, ,r 8 & n.6. The trial court thus acted well within 
its discretion when it used the best, most reliable information available to 
determine the value of the partially-customized Talon to the person 
directing and paying for the customization. See Smith v. Mine & Smelter 
Supply Co., 88 P. 683, 685 (Utah 1907) (" [T]he best evidence of which the 
nature of the case admits, in view of all the circumstances, is proper in that 
particular case, unless, by some rule of law, a particular kind of evidence is 
required."). 
B. England has not justified the alternative measures he 
proposes. 
England presents several alternative measurements of fair market 
value: the $300 he received from the scrapyard; the mechanic's $3,500 
estimate of the Talon's value; and the purchase price of the improvements 
made to the Talon, but not its original purchase price. England's arguments 
turn on the assumption that the relevant market here is the typical used-car 
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market or the scrap-metal market. But, as shown, those are the wrong 
benchmarks. Thus, each of the alternative measures England proposes 
would fail to fully compensate the victim for the loss he suffered when 
England stole the Talon that the victim was customizing for his son. 
England first argues that the "best evidence of the value a willing 
buyer would pay for the property at issue in this case was the price a buyer 
did pay: $300." Aplt. Br. at 10. England does not explain why his choice of 
how he disposed of the property he stole should limit the recovery of the 
person he stole it from. In fact, the scrap-metal market is not the relevant 
market for a partially-completed, customized car. Indeed, courts have 
repeatedly rejected the idea that property should be valued based on such 
second-hand markets. For example, in Smith v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., 
the Utah Supreme Court explained that even though "it may be said that 
worn or so-called second-hand household goods may have a market value, 
because they are sold by dealers, still the prices fixed and obtained by the 
dealers in such articles cannot be said to furnish a true test as the measure of 
damages." 88 P. at 685-86. The court acknowledged that the litigant in 
Smith might not have been able to obtain as much money as the jury 
awarded her for her household goods if she had had the goods "piled up in 
her dooryard or house and offered to sell them." Id. at 686. But the court 
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allowed for recovery based on the purchase price of the goods because the 
litigant had the goods "not for disposal in [a yard sale], but for daily use in 
her home, and we think she was entitled to recover the actual value in 
accordance with the rules laid down by the court." Id.; see also Ludlow, 2015 
UT App 146, 11 8-9 (noting the "large gap" between the "nominal amount" 
a willing buy would pay for used clothing and the value of the clothing to 
the original owner, and concluding that the nominal amount "may not have 
been an equitable calculation of those items' value"); State v. Tetrault, 2012 
VT 51, 1 13, 54 A.3d 146 (Vt. 2012) (" [D]efendant' s suggestion that the 
replacement cost can be estimated by what the items might fetch at a yard 
sale is pettifoggery." (cited by Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, 1 8)). Using the 
scrap-metal market to measure the value of a customized car that still had 
value to its owner would thus be inconsistent with the rule that the value of 
unique property is measured by value to its owner. Cf Black's Law 
Dictionary 1587 (8th ed. 2004) ( defining "scrap value" and "salvage value" 
as "[t]he value of an asset after it has become useless to the owner"). And 
$300 for a car that the victim had invested nearly $9,000 into would not have 
made the victim whole. 
England also supports this alternative figure by depicting the Talon 
as merely a "frame." Aplt. Br. at 12. The trial court implicitly rejected that 
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characterization when it found that the Talon had numerous improvements 
on it at the time of the theft. R138-39. England has not attempted to 
challenge that conclusion on appeal. Thus, the Talon was not scrap metal; it 
was a custom car in the making. Basing the Talon's value on the $300 it 
fetched at a scrapyard would have been inappropriate. 
England alternatively argues that the trial court should have based 
the value of the Talon on the mechanic's estimation that it was worth $3,500 
with the improvements but without the engine. Aplt. Br. at 10-11. To begin 
with, the mechanic presented the $3,500 as a minimum value, giving a range 
from $3,500 to $5,000. R161:10-11, 14-17, 60. Regardless, the mechanic's 
estimation was merely a guess based on an unlikely hypothetical scenario. 
The Talon had no engine in it and was partially customized to someone 
else's specifications. The trial court was thus presented with two 
estimations of the Talon's value: the mechanic's guess, and the purchase 
price of the car plus the purchase price of the improvements. While the trial 
court could have accepted the mechanic's estimation, it chose to rely on a 
more concrete calculation of the value of the improvements using the 
mechanic's invoices. Doing so was well within the trial court's discretion. 
Finally, England argues in the alternative that the Talon's value 
should be limited to the value of the improvements, excluding the original 
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purchase price of the Talon. Aplt. Br. at 12. England suggests that using the 
original purchase price was inappropriate because the Talon did not have 
the engine in it when he stole it. Aplt. Br. at 12. But the lack of an engine 
only highlights the fact that there was likely little or no market in which to 
determine the value of the stolen property. Before the theft, the victim had 
a car, with an engine, that he was customizing; after the theft, the victim 
was left with just the engine.4 Given the likely lack of any real market, 
using the purchase price of both the original car and the improvements is 
thus supported by caselaw. See Smith, 88 P. at 685-86; Ludlow, 2015 UT App 
146, ,I 8. But what is more, doing so is also the most appropriate way to 
determine what amount of restitution would make the victim whole. 
England's suggested approach would compensate the victim for the loss of 
the improvements, but not for the vehicle itself. Such an approach would 
be appropriate if the improvements were stolen off the car and the car itself 
had been returned. Cf State v. Birkeland, 2011 UT App 227, ,J,J 2-6, 14, 258 
P.3d 662 (upholding, in the face of a challenge to causation, the trial court's 
restitution order for the value of files erased from a computer, but not 
4 England does not argue that the trial court's restitution order should 
have been offset by the value that the engine could have fetched on the 
spare-parts markets. Rather, he argues that because the car did not have the 
engine in it, the original purchase price should not have been used at all. 
Aplt. Br. at 12. 
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including the value of the computer, when the computer was stolen and 
later recovered with only some of the files intact). But to establish the value 
of the partially customized Talon based solely on the value of the 
improvements would be to not account for II all demonstrable economic 
injury" that the victim suffered. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) 
(emphasis added). 
England also argues that use of the Talon's original purchase price as 
a starting point was inappropriate because the State did not meet its burden 
of producing evidence to relate the purchase price of the car to fair market 
value. Aplt. Br. at 7, 9, 12. It is true that, as an alternative to retail price, 
courts may use the property's original purchase price as a II starting point" 
from which to extrapolate fair market value so long as purchase price is 
11 connected by some competent evidence that brings the cost or purchase 
price into relation with market value." Haycraft, 24 P.2d at 1112; Ludlow, 
2015 UT App 146, ,r 12. But the link England says the State failed to make is 
necessary only when purchase price stands in for retail price. As shown, 
fair market value - whether determined using retail price or purchase 
price-is not the measure of damages when a thief converts property for 
which there is no market. And when purchase price is used to value that 
property, the law does not require additional evidence connecting purchase 
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price to the (non-existent) market. Haycraft, 24 P.2d at 1112; Ludlow, 2015 
UT App 146, ,r 8. Thus, use of the car's original purchase price was 
appropriate without any additional evidence connecting it to fair market 
value. 
Regardless, the State actually provided connecting evidence that 
demonstrates the reasonableness of the Talon's original purchase price. The 
State submitted evidence that the Kelley Blue Book private party resale 
value for 1995 Talons with comparable miles was $2,147 at the end of 2014. 
R161:14, Exl. England stole the Talon in mid-2013. Rl. Although the State 
did not provide specific evidence as to the rate of depreciation that could 
have given a more accurate Blue Book estimate for mid-2013, the purchase 
price of $2,500 is not far off from the Blue Book valuation. Furthermore, the 
mechanic testified that the condition of the car when he received it was 
"pristine." R161:13. He placed it in the "Very Good" Blue Book category 
rather than the "Excellent" category in 2011 when he first received the car, 
perhaps because of a "minor fender bender" it had at the time. R161:13-14; 
Exl. The State thus presented sufficient evidence connecting the original 
purchase price to the market for generic Talons and the trial court 
appropriately used that evidence as the starting point to determine the 
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value of the partially customized Talon by then adding the value of the 
improvements. 5 
* * * 
5 England argues, briefly, that by allowing the State to present 
evidence of "only the purchase price," the trial court effectively shifted the 
burden to the defendant to prove fair market value. Aplt. Br. at 9. England 
also points to an exchange between defense counsel and the trial court as 
evidence that the trial court shifted the burden. Aplt. Br. at 7, 9. When 
defense counsel said, "we really don't have an independent wih1ess to tell 
us what this car was worth," the trial court responded, "Right. You didn't 
bring one, they didn't bring one. I have the mechanic." R162:95. 
England's burden-shifting argument is unpreserved. "To preserve an 
issue for appeal, 'the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way 
that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."' State v. Cheek, 
2015 UT App 243, ~ 26, 2015 WL 6523169 (Oct. 29, 2015) (quoting 438 Main 
St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ~ 51, 99 P.3d 801). England made no 
contemporaneous objection and did not bring the alleged error to the trial 
court's attention at any other time. R162:95-96. Nor does he argue any 
exception to the preservation rule on appeal. Therefore, this Court should 
not reach England's belated argument. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 111, 10 
P.3d 346 ("Asa general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not 
be raised on appeal."); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
(declining to reach defendant's unpreserved argument when he did not 
argue any exception to the preservation rule). 
But even if this Court reaches the issue, England's argument does not 
provide grounds for relief. First, his argument fails because, as shown 
above, evidence connecting purchase price to retail price was unnecessary 
here. Second, even if evidence of retail price were necessary, the court was 
simply commenting on the state of the evidence. The mechanic did, in fact, 
testify as to what he thought the car was worth. R161:10-11, 14-15, 60. 
Thus, the trial court's comment must have referred to the mechanic's lack of 
independence due to his involvement in the underlying dispute. Third, as 
shown above, the State did present evidence connecting purchase price to 
retail value. Thus, the court's comments on the state of the evidence in no 
way shifted the burden of proof to England. 
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In sum, none of the alternative measures England proposes account 
for the facts of this case. The Talon was a partially customized tuner car, 
and the State presented sufficient evidence from which the trial court was 
able to measure the actual value of the Talon. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly exercised its broad discretion when it 
reasonably used the original purchase price of the car and the purchase 
price of improvements to determine the value of the partially-customized 
Talon. The trial court's calculation makes the victim whole by fully 
accounting for England's investment in the car itself and the improvements 
he made. This Court should thus affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on December 18, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
WILLIAM M. HAINS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
Utah Code Annotated§ 77-38a-102 Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
CI) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Crimina I activities" n,eans any offense of which the defendant is convicted 
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to 
the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct. 
(3) "Departrnent" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) ''Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on 
the condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, 
make restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a 
prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" rneans all demonstrable economic injury, whether or 
not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the 
fair market value of property taken, desh·oyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, 
and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive 
or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreen1ent entered between the prosecution and 
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges 
upon which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea disposition'' means an agreement entered into between the prosecution 
and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, 
or any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other 
jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(9) ,;Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the 
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from 
the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against hiin 
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he cornply with specific 
conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(10) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions 
upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be 
held i:n abeyance. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from 
the time of sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a 
reward, and payn1ent for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as may be further defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction 
of an offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons vvho provide this information, 
except that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an 
accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered 
to the public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate 
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution 
that has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person or entity, including the Utah Office for 
Victims of Crime, who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
@ 
@ 
Utah Code Annotated§ 77-38a-301 Restitution--Convicted defendant may be 
required to pay 
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make 
res ti tu ti on. 
Utah Code Annotated§ 77-38a-302 Restitution criteria 
(1) \,Vhen a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it rnay impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has 
the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as 
provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining res ti tu tion, the court shall determine complete res ti tu tion and 
court-ordered res ti tu tion. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim 
for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) ii Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the def end ant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the 
tin1e of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under 
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court 
record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
reslilu tion, the court sha1I allo\:v the defendant a fu 11 hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall 
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court 
or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that 
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, 
includes any pt~rson directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the 
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the nwnctary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the darnage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss 
or destruction of property of a victin1 of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necess,uy medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care 
and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized 
by the law of the place of trea tn,ent; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
reha bili ta tion; 
(iv) the income lost by the victin, as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost 
due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were 
owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current employ1nent 
at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in 
the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
res ti tu tion, the court shall consider: 
( i) the factors listed in Subsections (5)( a) and (b ); 
(ii) the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed in the financial 
declaration described in Section 77-38a-204; 
(iii) the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the 
other obligations of the defendant; 
(iv) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or 
on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(v) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and 
the method of payment; and 
(vi) other circumstances that the court deterrnines may make restitution 
ina ppropria le. 
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine 
comp]ete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all 
restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one 
year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court 
within one year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons 
and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, 
refer an order of judgrnent and commitment back to the court for 
detern-1ination of restitution. 
Addendum B 
Addend un-1 B 
FILED 
THIRD DISTRICT coup-
MAR OCJ 2015 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF.~H,R D 7/Vt~T-JU Jl,{\J o,·p, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT t 1 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
RESTITUTION 
vs. 
KRISTOPHER ENGLAND, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 131401508 
Judge: Charlene Barlow 
This matter came before the Court on December 11, 2014, and again on January 8, 2015, on 
State's motion for restitution and defendant's objection to the amount of restitution. The Cowt 
¼) received evidence, testimony, and argument and took the matter under advisement. The Cowt 
having reviewed the evidence and argument, hereby enters its ruling. 
Restitution is defined as "full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim[.]" Utah Code Ann. §78-38a-102(11). In this matter, defendant does not challenge that he 
owes restitution but challenges the amount request by motion by t~e State of over $13,000. The 
Court conducted a restitution hearing over two separate days and has arrived at the following 
detennination based on the evidence presented. 
li:I The victim, Michael Maus, testified that he paid $2500 to purchase an automobile to restore. 
Further evidence from the person who worked on the restoration led to the following amounts: 
Invoice 1001----body kit $482.09 and a paint job minus $1500 for the final coat which was not 
'I) applied ($3000); this adds up to $3482.09 plus tax of $238.52 for a total of $3720.61. 
Invoice 1002----head light assembly set $345.36 plus tax totaling $369.02 
Invoice 1003----All installed except the TXS-BOV-H-RFL and TCK-DSM-TD0516G plus tax 
totaling $802.85 
Invoice 1004----All installed totaling $595.95 
Invoice 1005----Battery only plus tax totaling $144.19 
Invoice 1006----Wheel hubs only installed plus tax totaling $145. 25. 
0001.38 
T~ese amounts are based on the testimony that some of the parts were not installed and are still in 
the witness' storage; consequently, they may be available for sale to mitigate damages. 
Adding all of these amounts, the Court finds that the restitution owing to Mr. Maus is 
$8277.87. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that defendant owes restitution in the 
amount of $8277 .87 to Michael Maus. The State is directed to prepare a final order for the Court's 
signature. 
DATED this -..i!!day of f"¼x.: t..1. , 2015. 
District Judge 
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SIM GILL, Bar No. 6389 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
TYSON V. HAMILTON, Bar No. 10808 
111 E. BROADWAY, SUITE #400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Telephone: (385) 468-7600 
DAO #13025992 
The Order of Court is' 
Dated: April 22, 2015 
05:14:06 PM 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
KRISTOPHER ENGLAND, 
Defendant 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
i 
I FINAL ORDER FOR RESTITUTION 
i 
Case Number 131401508 
Honorable CHARLENE BARLOW 
------ . ·------·-·--- ·-··-·· ··-··· . ---· ··~·--- ----· -··---·---------
Based upon the State's MOTION FOR RESTITUTION and good cause appearing thereby, and 
no response or objection being made thereto, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant pay 
complete and court ordered restitution in the amount of $8,277.87 for the benefit of victim, 
Michael Maus, in the minimum amount of $100 Dollars per month. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
**Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date and seal at the top of the page** 
CONTINUED TO PAGE TWO 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order for Restitution was 
sent, this 21st day of April, 2015, via the Court's electronic filing system or by US mail as 
addressed, to the following: 
Wesley Howard, LDA 
Attorney at Law 
Isl 
Barbara Hudson, Legal Secretary 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Kelley Blue Book Page 1 of 2 
KeUev Blue Book TheTnistetl Resource ' 
. 
MILES AWAY FROM' HO-HUM. 
Advertisement 
1995 Eagle Talon 
Pricing Report 
Style: TSi Coupe 2D 
Mileage: 137,ooo 
Vehicle Highlights 
Fuel Economy: 
City 21/Hwy 29/Comb 24 MPG 
Doors: 2 
Drivetrain : FWD 
EPA Class: Sub Compact Ca rs 
Country of Origin: United States 
Max Seating: 4 
Engine: 4-Cyl, Turbo, 2.0 Liter 
Transmission: Manual, 5-Spd 
Body Style: Coupe 
Country of Assembly: United States 
Your Configured Options 
Our pre-selected options, based on typical equipment for this car. 
✓ Options that you added whi le configuring this car . 
Engine 
4-Cyl, Turbo, 2.0 Li ter 
Transmission 
Manual, 5-Spd 
Drivetrain 
FWD 
Glossary of Terms 
Comfort and Convenience 
Air Conditioning 
Power Windows 
Power Door Locks 
Cruise Control 
Steering 
Power Steering 
Tilt Wheel 
Entertainment and Instrumentation 
AM/FM Stereo 
Cassette 
Kelley Blue Book® Trade-in Value - This is the amount you can expect to receive when you trade in 
your car to a dealer. This value is determined based on the style, condition, mileage and options 
indicated. 
Trade-In Range -The Trade-In Range is Kelley Blue Book's estimate of what you can reasonably expect 
to receive this week based on the style, condl~on, mileage and options of your vehic le when you trade it 
in to a dealer. However, every dealer is different and values are not guaranteed. 
Kelley Blue Book® Private Party Value - This is the starting point for negotiation of a used-car sale 
between a private buyer and seller. This is an "as is" value that does not include any warranties. The final 
price depends on the car's actual condition and local market factors. 
A'(Kt1'?) :n:11n·J.m opitrr ... ~rc-~ t.~Don 1n~d11•,.,111•,,1,~•· 
Why ads? 
Sell To Private Party 
.=air 
Cc :<: d it io":l 
Good 
Cc:id1t ·?n 
S2.,066 '-(ery 91:'oo \..O.": C .t1cn 
$2.14 7 
-. 
'i 
Private Party Values valid for your area through 
12/11/2014 
Safety and Security 
Dual Air Bags 
Wheels and Tires 
Alloy Wheels 
Tip : 
It's crucial to know your car's 
true condition when you sell it, 
so that you can price it 
appropriately. Consider having 
your mechanic give you an 
objective report. 
STATE'S 
EXHIBIT 
I 
htto: //www.kbb.com/eag]e/talon/1995-eaQle-talon /tsi-cmme-2cl/?cr11·P.P-nrv=&intent=trr1 cl P.- . 
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THESPEEDSHOPLLC 
7586 South Redwood Rel 
west jordan. UT 84084 
(80·1 )255-5877 
BU TO 
fvlichae I Maus 
'173'1-E Hidden IVleadows Rd. 
Ho lladay. UTAH 84'1 '17 USA 
Automoti ve Body Kit 
·1995-1999 IVl it subishi Eclipse Eagle Ta Ion Durafle~: Sensei Body 
Kit-4 Piece - Includes Sensei Front Bumper Cover {'10'16 '12) Blits 
Rear BL1111per Cover ('10'18 74) Blits Side Sl<i 1ts Rocker Pa nels 
("I 0'1599} 
Paint .O.nc! Installation 
complete with a base _coat primer fini sh . high quality mesh grille. 
hardware kit. ancl general installation \/llith Duraflex aero pa1ts. A 
_· full high quality' lliree Stage CLIStom pa int job to cL1stom co lor. 
Sales Tax 
Utah Saies Ta:< 6.85'¾, 
,. . . . 
SALES~~CEIPT 100, .·. 
. . 
DA TE 06/04/2012 . 
~; - . . . - . : . . 
. . . -
PMT METHOD Cash · . . 
. . . ... . . . . . . . . . : · ... -:.. . . . . 
l 482.09 
4.500.00 
·1 34'1 .'27 
TOTAL 
AIVIOU I\JT RECErVED 
482.09 
4,500.00 
34·1.27 
5,323 .36 
5.323.36 
ir. ',·.,  '._i.:.\':"t·-~c~·-~:t·~·.;~?-_~:r-·: .·, .'.'_' /'? ·. ~- i:·:. :.- :,: r -~?~\~ 
•·,··: lffffs~_qµ~:-·i·, -, · : ·:;- ·. ·- . --. -_.- _._. .- - $OJJo-.-- ';,, 
(~-:/~. :.<_: : · ·: ~:~_~;;/:1}["==~::>"~{;;.~t~-- .-·-:-;/. ~·~:~:- !. J ~ •• / X ;·.} ~ · ··~·~· : : · .• / :.·~~•;'.;~~ 
THESPEEDSHOPLLC 
7586 South Redwood Rel 
west jordan. UT 84084 
(80'1 )255-5877 
BILL TO 
Michael Maus 
'173'1 E Hidden Meadows Rd. 
Holladay. UTAH 34·1 '17 USA 
SALES RECEIPT 1002 
DATE 07/04/2012 
,.;,:Tr-/lTY •.:in1 RATE AMOUNT -
Head Light Assembley Set 
Item Number: ·127552·13 Mitsubishi Eclipse ·1997_·1999. Blacl< Halo 
Projector Headlights with LEDs Gen 2 by An=o USM·. ·1 Pair. 
Tail Light A ssembley Set 
Item Number: 26477·1 Mitsubishi Eclipse 1997. Smoke Tail Lights 
by Spycler·F··. vv'ith Phillips Lighting. 3 Pieces. 
Sales Tax 
Utah Sales Ta x 6.85% 
345.36 
220.42 
38.76 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT RECEIVED 
I • 
345 .36 
220.42 
38 .76 
604.54 
604.54 
TOTA~ OlJl: ! . .$0,00 . : 
! ~ I • 
• 
• 
THESPEEDSHOPLLC 
7586 South Redwood Rel 
west jorclan. UT c:4034 
(301 )255-3877 
BILL TO 
lv1ichael IVlaus 
'173·1 E Hidden Meadows Rel. 
Ho lladay. UTAH 34·1 '17 USA 
. . 
SALES RECEIPT 1003 .. 
. . 
DATE 05/05/2011 . 
. . . 
--· -- • ...,- ___ _ - - --. __ • - - -.: •• ·-- ·: • • • • •• • • • I • • • , I • ' 
· tl,CTII/ITY · . · . · - . . . OT'(. ·· · RATE_ · . · · · ·. .A.MOUl•JT ·' -
•• • •••• - • •• , • • • • • • • - • I • · • • • • -
Txs-bov-h-rfl 
'185.95 '185.95 , 
Part Number: TXS-8OV-H-RFL Blow-Off Va lve. Type H-RFL. 
Aluminum. Clear An ocli:.ed. 35+ psi. Universal. Each 
TX S-H-ECL-G2 
-1 68.40 68.40 
Part I\J umber: TXS-H-EC L-G2 Blow-Off Valve .Adapter. Type H. 
Aluminum. Reel Anocli:.ed . IVlitsubishi. Each 
IPK-95ECLIPSE 294.99 294.99 
BOLT O1\J P IPIMG f<IT: 
Brand new dsm '.::g 4g63 bolt on polished aluminum piping kit. 1lle 
piping l<it is made of high quality TG0G ·1 aluminum. Direct.bolt on 
design. 2.5" inlet diameter. increase more airflow. It comes with 
/ high quality 4PL--( sili cone .co L1p lers and strong ancl tighter t-bolt 
cla mp30"X9"X2 .75" FROI\IT IVIOUNT INTERCOO LER : ,,. 
Brand new Llniversal 30"X9"X:2.75"' front mount intercooler. The 
intercoo ler is made of high qua fi ty TG0G·I aluminum _ lt has tube and 
fin des ign , high f low and light weight·. tt can support up to 450H P 
ancl 35PS !. 
TCt';. -DSM-TD0516 G 5·19_99 5'19.99 r 
l11i s is a perfect turbo charger kit for upgrading DSIVI ·1G/::'.G 
engine. It is bolt on design ancl includes a II the bolts . gaskets and 
comp lete oil line kit. It is goocl fo r huge horsepower increase alon~1 
1Nith improve more air flo v.1. It can gain 30-40HP_ l11i s turbo cha rger 
l<it can suppo1t up to 350HP and deliver 580CFIVI. 
AP X-145-KM02 387.99 387 .99 
APX-·I45-l<IVl0:2 Th ese Jl.'PEXi clovmpipes are the pipe s on turbo 
vehi cles that connect the turbine e:,haust housing to th e catal~Aic 
converter_ 
= STATE'S ij 
§ EXH BIT 
~ L.0 I ~ ( "' I z UJ ~ "-
" - =~ 
.cn✓rrv . · . - cT.Y . R ;\TE · · . ·_ : · · .,;1,1e,ur.rr · ; 
• ' ' , • ·1 . • . . • • • . 
Sales Tax 
Utah·Sales Tc1x6.85'¾, 
99,83 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT RECENED 
99.83 
·1 ,557 :15 
·1 .557.·I 5 
TOTAL DUE . $0.00 
. . . . . . . . . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
THESPEEDSHOPLLC 
7586 South Redwood Rel 
west jorclan. UT 84084 
(80"1)255-5877 
BILL TO 
IVlichael Maus 
'173'1 E Hidden Meadows Rel. 
Holladay. UTAH 84'1 H USA 
SALES REC.EIPT 1004 
DA TE 05/05/2011 
PMT ME11--IOD Cash 
A•':.Tl ✓ ITY · .. . - . QTY. . F:ATE . - - . A1v!OUNT 
. • . I • 
14419 
IVluffler. 3.00 in. ln let/3.00 in. Out let. Stain less Steel. Polished. 
Each 
MPE-10778 
E:<haust Pipe. Stain less Y-Pipe. DL1al In let 2.5 in .. 3 in. Single 
Outlet. ·1 0 in. Long. Each 
FL0-815937 
Exhaust System. U-Fit Dua ls. Stainless Steel. Heacle1·-Bacl<. 3.0 in. 
Diameter. Kit 
Sales Tax 
Utah Sales Tax 6.85'X, 
2 88.43 
·1 30.89 
349.99 
38.2·1 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT RECEfVED 
'176 .86 
30.89 
349 .99 
38 .2 '1 
595.95 
595.95 
. ', ·,, - :·:, :, -. . .-.·.· i· ~--·':··· ', .. · .•·,,-, ._.:.,. :: .· ·.:: .-J; 
.. - -J{?.TALPUE . . : .- _., .-· . _, .. ::$0,,0.Q '_·.-:·':.; 
"'-· -...:. ~- -.. :.;; _. -~: · -- ·:" · __ ·. -. ·: :'.: · -i :_ .. ,-:-.. -.. , ~ . . -:\~ .··/_:.~_.>·.,:-,.~:-~:A 
THESPEEDSHOPLLC 
7586 South Redwood Rel 
west jorclan. UT 84084 
(80'1 )255-5877 
BILL TO. 
Michael Maus 
'173'1 E Hiclclen Meadows Rel . 
Holladay. UTAH 84'1 '17 US.A. 
SALES RECEIPT 1005 
DATE 06/05/2012 
·itnir(y_:, ..... .. : ... ·. •·.· .. · ;.- · · ',· ·~·-- ·. ,:;iTVj RATE .· .· .. AlvlOUMT · 
. . . . . . ' . . .. . . ' . .· ·. . ' '· . . ' . ·- . ., ' . . 
lnst-sc 34du-i1 
Interstate battery optima yel low toi) Battery 
MSD-32279 · 
Spark Plug Wires. Super Conductor. SpiI·aI Core. 8.5mm. Reel. 
Stock Boots . Chrysler. Dodge. DOHC. :.o Set. 
MSD-8239 
Ignition Coil. DIS Pe1formance Replacement. Square. Epo:,;y, Reel, 
36.000 V. Each 
NGK-6962 
Spark Plug. \/-Power. Gasket Seat. ·14111111 ll1read .. 750 in . Reach . 
. Projected Tip. Res istor. Each 
Sales tax 
Utah Sales Ta;.; 6.85% 
·1 '134.95 
56.95 
·1 73.97 
4 3.49 
. '19.'17 
TOTAL 
AIVIOUl,IT RECEIVED 
'134.95 
56.95 
73.97 
'13 .96 . 
'19:17 
299 .00 
299.00 
'.\ _  ~·-:·=-:_:=~·~.::::tr,_":.~~~-- --~ ... ~, .... - -~ .. ~·- ·~ ·_: ··::·.~-~---.-: :··· ·::.~:, ;· ~~ 
.-, ··. TOTAL.QUE . . . i · . . . $0.00 
t~: :! ;-:/"/:·~ ..... :· .·. ·_ '~ ·. _· .. " .. ' \ . '· .. : : ·~. ' ': ·... ·-/ ·. ' ... : -~ 
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• 
• 
• 
THESPEEDSHOPLLC 
7586 South Redwood Rd 
west jordan. UT 84084 
(80'1 )255-5877 
BILL TO 
Michael Maus 
'173 '1 E Hidden Meaclows Rel . 
Ho lladay, UT.A.H 84·1 '17 USA 
SALES RECEIPT 1006 
DATE 02/18/2013 
,.;(TJ·.; fTY OTY F'ATE AMOUNT -
INJ-IS1890P 
Air lntal<e, IS Seri es. Polished TL1be. Blue Filter, Mitsubishi , Kit 
ACL-DN5-HDSS 
Clutch Kit, 8.8·19 in . Diameter. Heavy Duty. Street . Dodge. 2.0L. Kit 
MOG-513157 
Whee l Hub and Bearing Assembty. Front. Ch1·:1s ler. Dodge. 
Mitsubishi. Each 
Sales Tax 
Utah Safes Tax 6.85% 
276.9 '1 
·1 473.38 
,., 67.97 ~ 
'19.'17 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT RE CEIVED 
276.91 
473 .38 
'135.94 
'19 .'17 
905.40 
905 .40 
. . . : ~ . . . - -· - - ~. : 
TOTAL DUE ' $0.00 _: 
; • • : . • I • - • , , .... ~ 
